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and much-disputed subject, and they bring to bear — in civil, elegant 
prose — a range of diﬀ erent perspectives. By assembling this “conversation” 
and inviting the public to join in, we intend to spark a discussion 
that transcends the familiar positions usually found in such debates. We 
aim to turn discourse on the Big Questions in a more thoughtful, 
considered direction. It is our hope that this booklet will be a lasting 
resource for students, teachers, parents, political leaders, scientists, clergy, 
and anyone else engaged with the great issues of human nature and 
purpose. Additional copies of the booklet can be ordered by writing to
bigquestions@templeton.org.
Four previous conversations on Big Questions at the core of the 
Foundation’s mandate may also be of interest to readers. Th ey can be 
found online at the following addresses: 
Does the universe have a purpose?
 www.templeton.org/purpose
Will money solve Africa’s development problems?
 www.templeton.org/africa
Does science make belief in God obsolete?
www.templeton.org/belief
Does the free market corrode moral character?
www.templeton.org/market
The John Templeton Foundation serves as a philanthropic catalyst for research on what scientists and philosophers call the Big Questions. We support work at the world’s top universities in 
such ﬁ elds as theoretical physics, cosmology, evolutionary biology, 
cognitive science, and social science relating to love, forgiveness, creativity, 
purpose, and the nature and origin of religious belief. We encourage 
informed, open-minded dialogue between scientists and theologians as 
they apply themselves to the most profound issues in their particular 
disciplines. And we seek to stimulate new thinking about wealth creation 
in the developing world, character education in schools and universities, 
and programs for cultivating the talents of gifted children. 
Th e Big Question posed in these pages celebrates the bicentenary 
of the birth of Charles Darwin, the founding genius of modern biology. 
We have focused on the long-standing debate over how well the theory of 
evolution can explain human nature — a subject of heated contention in 
Darwin’s day as in our own. An important new aspect of the discussion, as 
many of our essayists emphasize, is the transformation that evolutionary 
theory itself has undergone in recent decades. Researchers have concluded 
that natural selection helps to explain the development of a range of 
human emotions, behaviors, and capacities — and not just the stereotypically 
“selﬁ sh”  ones. Evolutionary theory has become a powerful tool in trying to 
understand such traits as altruism, cooperation, religious belief, and moral 
commitment. But is it suﬃ  cient for a full understanding of these 
human qualities? And does evolutionary theory illuminate such intractably 
diﬃ  cult subjects as human consciousness, free will, and spirituality?
 Th is booklet neatly embodies the approach that we take to the Big 
Questions across all of the Foundation’s areas of interest. Th e contributors 
are distinguished scientists and scholars, they address a perennial 
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FRANS DE WAAL
and blood with a brain that, albeit three times larger than that 
of a chimpanzee, does not contain any new parts. Our intellect may be 
superior, but we have no basic wants or needs that cannot also be 
observed in our close relatives. I interact daily with chimpanzees and 
bonobos, which are known as anthropoids precisely because of their 
human-like characteristics. Like us, they strive for power, enjoy sex, want 
security and aﬀ ection, kill over territory, and value trust and cooperation. 
Yes, we use cell phones and ﬂ y airplanes, but our psychological make-up 
remains that of a social primate.
To explain human behavior as a “mere” product of evolution, however, 
is often seen as insulting and a threat to morality, as if such a view would 
absolve us from the obligation to lead virtuous lives. Th e geneticist 
Francis Collins sees the “moral law” as proof that God exists. Conversely, 
I have heard people echo Dostoevsky’s Ivan Karamazov, exclaiming 
that “If there is no God, I am free to rape my neighbor!”
Perhaps it is just me, but I am wary of anyone whose belief system is the 
only thing standing between them and repulsive behavior. Why not 
assume that our humanity, including the self-control needed to form a 
livable society, is built into us? Does anyone truly believe that our 
ancestors lacked rules of right and wrong before they had religion? Did 
they never assist others in need or complain about an unfair share? 
Human morality must be quite a bit older than religion and civilization. 
It may, in fact, be older than humanity itself. Other primates live in 
highly structured cooperative groups in which rules and inhibitions 
apply and mutual aid is a daily occurrence. 
Even without claiming other primates as moral beings, it is not hard 
to recognize the pillars of morality in their behavior. Th ese are summed 
up in our golden rule, which transcends the world’s cultures and religions. 
“Do unto others as you would have them do unto you” brings together 
empathy (attention to the feelings of others) and reciprocity (if others 
follow the same rule, you will be treated well, too). Human morality could 
not exist without empathy and reciprocity, tendencies that have been 
found in our fellow primates.
Frans de Waal 
Obviously, says 
the monkey.
Human nature simply cannot be understood in 
isolation from the rest of nature. Th is evolutionary 
approach is already diﬃ  cult for many people to 
accept, but it is likely to generate even more resistance 
once its implications are fully grasped. After all, 
the idea that we descend from long-armed, hairy 
creatures is only half the message of evolutionary 
theory. Th e other half is continuity with all other 
life forms. We are animals not only in body but also 
in mind. Th is idea may prove harder to swallow.
We are so convinced that humans are the only 
intelligent life on earth that we search for other 
intelligent beings in distant galaxies. We also never 
seem to run out of claims about what sets us apart, 
even though scientiﬁ c progress forces us to adjust 
these claims every couple of years. Th at is why 
we do not hear any more that only humans make 
tools, imitate each other, have culture, think ahead, are self-aware, or 
adopt another’s point of view. It is the rare claim of human uniqueness 
that holds up for more than a decade.
If we look at our species without letting ourselves be blinded by the 
technological advances of the last few millennia, we see a creature of ﬂ esh 
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to negative behavior — when humans maim and kill each other, we are 
quick to call them “animals” — but we prefer to claim noble traits 
exclusively for ourselves. When it comes to the study of human nature, 
this is a losing strategy, however, because it excludes about half of our 
background. Short of appealing to divine intervention as an explanation, 
this more attractive half is also the product of evolution, a view now 
increasingly supported by animal research. 
Th is insight hardly subtracts from human dignity. To the contrary, 
what could be more digniﬁ ed than primates who use their natural gifts 
to build a humane society?
After one chimpanzee has been attacked by another, for example, a 
bystander will go over to gently embrace the victim until he or she stops 
yelping. Th e tendency to console is so strong that Nadia Kohts, a Russian 
scientist who raised a juvenile chimpanzee a century ago, said that when 
her charge escaped to the roof of the house, there was only one way to 
get him down. Holding out food would not do the trick; the only way 
would be for her to sit down and sob, as if she were in pain. Th e young ape 
would rush down from the roof to put his arm around her. Th e empathy 
of our closest evolutionary relatives exceeds even their desire for bananas.
Reciprocity, on the other hand, is visible when chimpanzees share food 
speciﬁ cally with those who have recently groomed them or supported 
them in power struggles. Sex is often part of the 
mix. Wild males have been observed to take 
great risks raiding papaya plantations, returning 
to share the delicious fruit with fertile females 
in exchange for copulation. Chimps know how 
to strike a deal.
Our primate relatives also exhibit pro-social 
tendencies and a sense of fairness. In experiments, 
chimpanzees voluntarily open a door to 
give a companion access to food, and capuchin 
monkeys seek rewards for others even if 
they themselves gain nothing from it. Perhaps 
helping others is self-rewarding in the same 
way that humans feel good doing good. In 
other studies, primates will happily perform a 
task for cucumber slices until they see others 
being rewarded with grapes, which taste so much better. Th ey become 
agitated, throw down their measly cucumbers, and go on strike. A 
perfectly ﬁ ne vegetable has become unpalatable! I think of their reaction 
whenever I hear criticism of the extravagant bonuses on Wall Street.
Th ese primates show hints of a moral order, and yet most people still 
prefer to view nature as “red in tooth and claw.” We never seem to doubt 
that there is continuity between humans and other animals with respect 
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of these developments have occurred independently and by the process 
of evolution. 
So why quibble with the standard Darwinian formulation? Is it not 
obvious that the roots of human behavior and cultural sophistication lie 
in the rich loam of our evolutionary past? We are but a hair’s breadth 
from our animal cousins. Such is evident in terms of their cognitive 
world (which many believe encompasses, at least in apes and some birds, 
a theory of mind), their capacity for self-recognition in mirrors, and the 
glimmerings among them not just of culture and its transmission but of 
crafted tools and even traits of personality. So what is the problem? 
At one level, there is none. It would be strange if my ﬁ ngers and eyes 
were to have an evolutionary origin but not my capacity to speak, to 
empathize, and even to deal with simple abstractions like numbers. And 
yet, though we may be just a hair’s breadth away from a chimp — not 
to mention a crow, a dolphin, an elephant, and even an octopus — we 
humans are still utterly and stupendously diﬀ erent. A seamless extrapo-
lation from one species to another? Th at is what Darwin proposed, 
but pinning down how the glaring gaps — most obviously, language 
— were actually bridged remains almost entirely obscure. 
Should we look, then, to human exceptionalism, to a freak mutation 
that suddenly propelled us into new worlds? It is possible, of course, but 
there is not a shred of evidence for it. Could it just be an illusion? 
Perhaps we think we are diﬀ erent, but the animals themselves know 
better. Is that credible? Not really. So profound is the gulf between us 
and the chimps that they might as well live in the Andromeda galaxy. 
Have you seen a chimp make a ﬁ re, let alone go to the library? 
Th e late David Stove, an Australian philosopher, wrote a wonderful 
book entitled Darwinian Fairytales. How dare anybody use a word like 
“fairytale” in the same breath as the venerated Darwin? (See how the 
cage housing the ultra-Darwinists rocks and shudders, the occupants 
hurling themselves against the bars with cries of outrage.) But Stove was 
emphatically not a creationist or even a theist, let alone a Christian. 
And he had no quarrel with evolution. For him, the question was not 
Simon Conway Morris
Except where 
it matters.
As I write this essay, my ﬁ ngers hold a pen and my 
eyes scan the page — ﬁ ngers that have evolved from 
ﬁ ns, eyes that have developed from little more than 
pigmented spots. We may walk tall, but we cast a 
long evolutionary shadow. At the same time, my ears 
are distracted by bird-song from the yard outside. 
But why should I bother to waste my time listening 
to the birds? Why, indeed, should I be interested if 
three separate families of birds — songbirds, parrots, 
and hummingbirds — all evolved song independently, 
and why should I care that the manner in which 
some birds learn to sing is strikingly similar to the 
way that language emerges from babble in children?
Th e answer is that I am naturally curious and also 
that I appreciate beauty. Th e evolution of bird-song 
is not only a striking example of evolutionary 
convergence — that is, of unrelated organisms arriving 
at very much the same biological solution — but it has a much wider 
importance. It is an indication that at least some outcomes of the Dar-
winian process are more likely than others and, in some cases perhaps, 
are actually inevitable. Th e capacity for song points to even more striking 
similarities between birds and mammals in terms of overall cognitive 
capacity, not least with respect to play and the manufacture of tools. All 
Simon Conway Morris 
is a professor of 
evolutionary paleobiology 
at the University of 
Cambridge and a Fellow 
of St. John’s College. 
Elected to the Royal 
Society in 1990, he is 
the author, most recently, 
of  Life’s Solution: 
Inevitable Humans in a 
Lonely Universe.
A  T E M P L E T O N  C O N V E R S AT I O N
1 0 1 1
grunts and howls, the dawning intelligence and the scarcely articulated 
emotions, we do indeed see the ﬂ ickerings of ourselves. 
Th e real question of how we came to be who we are does not revolve 
around a process of creeping Darwinian emergence, whereby the various 
components drifted together into a human whole with distinctive and 
(let us be honest) very odd powers all of its own. Rather it is a true story 
of discovery, of ﬁ rst detecting and then entering and ﬁ nally enjoying 
entirely new worlds that were waiting for us all the time. We could not 
have arrived where we are except by evolution, and this is where we 
need to be. As rational creatures we now not only know evolution but we 
know how to transcend it.
where we came from but who we are now. In a piercing critique, he 
dismantled the Darwinian pieties purporting to show why  we are so 
extraordinarily altruistic (not to mention our love of animals), demolished 
the absurdities of genetic determinism, exploded the naiveties of 
sociobiology, and laid waste the myth that we are “just another species.”
But how did we come to be so diﬀ erent, in fact, so very odd? I would 
propose a radical alternative. We live in a world riddled with symbols and 
symbolic expression — a place where people kill for principle or engage 
in reckless altruism, where thousands cheer their teams while others 
choose monastic isolation. Our societies buzz with chatter, friendship, 
and laughter, but they are also haunted by terrible, reﬂ ective silences, 
echoing back through history for hundreds of years. 
Somehow we have intuited the ineﬀ able, 
matters that defy precise description but still 
resonate at the deepest levels. Th e world of 
myth is not just a set of superior fairy stories but 
rather an attempt to use language to describe 
our cosmic engagement. Is all this striving after 
ultimate meaning a massive delusion, a gigantic 
wish-fulﬁ llment? Is this what happens when 
the brain gets too big: the puzzled and frightened 
ape stumbles across comprehension and just 
as suddenly realizes that his existence is entirely 
meaningless? Could our symbol-rich world 
be of interest only to a pitiless nihilist? I do not 
think so. 
Suppose that the moral structure, the ethical 
voice, the heart-wrenching aesthetic, the 
haunting intuition that certain places are holy, 
the endless yearning for a world made good are not the fantasies of a 
deracinated ape but rather are signposts to deep realities in which our 
destiny may be involved. Suppose that evolution is like a search engine, 
always seeking the best solution. From this perspective, it is hardly 
surprising that scattered across the evolutionary landscape, among the 
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self-regarding. So-called reciprocal altruism — I’ll carry your baby if 
you take my son on the hunt tomorrow at dawn — is operative in species 
whose members are capable of recognizing each others’ faces. More 
important is the praise we love and the blame we dread, instincts that 
help bind tribe members who work together. Reciprocal acts of 
kindness and aid underlie families, tribes, and religious groups; they 
ensure survival and reproduction as “naturally selected” perpetuating, 
living entities.
Our human sort of mutual care, along with the strong feeling of life 
we have in the presence of sexual partners, family, friends, colleagues, 
classmates, and fellow citizens (in short, in the company of meaningful 
others), necessitates frequent communication: symbols, language, music, 
teaching, learning, etc. Do these activities fundamentally distinguish 
us from the non-human life forms with whom we share the planet and 
upon whom we depend for our survival? I doubt it. 
Th is may sound inadequate to true believers in human uniqueness, 
especially on religious grounds. But religion serves an obvious evolutionary 
function: it identiﬁ es, uniﬁ es, and preserves adherents. Admonitions 
to desist from the seven deadly sins inhibit behaviors that threaten group 
solidarity and survival. Greed, for example, privileges the individual 
in seasons of limited resources. Lust — the biblical coveting of the 
neighbor’s wife (in its male-centered perspective) — interferes with ideals 
for the nurture of healthy children and eﬀ ective warriors. Prohibiting 
sloth enhances productive work intrinsic to survival and reproduction of 
the social unit. Anger, perhaps useful in battle, destroys family and 
other social relationships. Envy and pride promote individual interests 
above those of the larger social unit. Th e survival value of prohibiting 
sin seems obvious.
By contrast, “love thy neighbor,” interpreted from an evolutionary point 
of view, is an algorithm for social connectedness. Th e touted virtues of 
chastity, moderation, compassion, diligence, patience, moral commitment, 
and humility provide touchstones for eﬀ ective group action. Th e intellec-
tual historian Karen Armstrong, a former nun and the author of books 
on Christianity, Judaism, and Islam, argues that compassion is the crucial 
Lynn Margulis  
Quite well.
Ever since Bishop Wilberforce asked, in a debate 
with Th omas Huxley, whether it was from his 
grandmother or grandfather that he claimed descent 
from a monkey, the suﬃ  ciency of evolutionary 
theory to explain humanity’s spiritual and moral 
qualities has been in question. Th en, as now, the 
evolution of humans was a touchy subject, and after 
the publication of On the Origin of Species, Darwin 
devoted a separate work, Th e Descent of Man, to 
untangling how evolutionary understanding could 
be applied to humans and their special traits. 
Since his account of “descent with modiﬁ cation” 
leaned heavily on natural selection of the individual, 
Darwin wondered how moral behaviors — which 
focus on others — evolved. When lying, cheating, 
manipulation, greed, and other less than admirable 
qualities seemed to beneﬁ t those individuals who 
practiced them, how could their opposites evolve? 
Pointing out that he “who was ready to sacriﬁ ce his 
life … would often leave no oﬀ spring to inherit
his noble nature,” Darwin pondered how members of a tribe became 
endowed with moral attributes. 
His simple answers still apply. One who aids his fellows commonly 
receives aid in return. Darwin called this a “low motive” because it is 
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the only documented cases of the “origin of species” in real time involve 
not selﬁ sh genes but “selﬂ ess” mergers of diﬀ erent forms. Chemical 
and genetic evidence suggests that even mitochondria, bodies inside all 
of our cells that suﬀ ocate without oxygen, came from ancient mergers, 
truces between oxygen-respiring bacteria and the nearly poisoned 
cells of other kinds of microscopic beings. Th e mergers, naturally selected, 
survived to thrive and spread across the planet.
Gifted with large brains that permit us great neurological processing 
power, we humans plan further into the future. We recognize more 
of our own kind with whom, now via global communication, we establish 
relationships of identity and trust. But on a crowded planet, there 
has always been a premium on eﬀ ective togetherness. Our moral nature 
reﬂ ects rather than conﬂ icts with nature. 
Free will may also be nature-deep. Large single-celled forams choose 
from brightly colored sand grains the correct ones with which to make 
shells. Aware of shape and color, they make choices and reproduce their 
kind. Awareness in some form has been naturally selected for at least 
550 million years. For me, our spirituality and moral nature help perpetuate 
our living communities, just as similar attributes aided previous 
living communities whose evolution is chronicled in the fossil record.
Photo credit: Mariana Cook.
link among the major religions. Th e golden rule of Jesus, Confucius, and 
others is that we should not do to others what we would not want them 
to do to us. Is this not a clear precept for the evolutionary perpetuation of 
speciﬁ c cohesive groups in familiar habitats?
We diﬀ er from other species in that fewer 
rules of social behavior are communicated 
only by shout, groan, touch, and facial expres-
sion and more by verbal explication. But 
all tend to maintain and perpetuate unity of 
the pack, gaggle, or herd. We people share 
a linguistic version of the universal tendency 
toward socio-ecological wisdom measurable 
in life forms at every level. After my collabora-
tive scientiﬁ c work for over a half century to 
detail the genetics, microscopy, and biochemis-
try of cells that adhere in their lives together, 
I consider the neo-Darwinist overemphasis 
on competition among selﬁ sh individuals 
— who supposedly perpetuate their genes as if they were robots — to be a 
Victorian caricature. Disease microbes that kill all their victims perish 
themselves as a result of their aggression. 
I disagree with neo-Darwinist zoologists who assert that the accumula-
tion of random genetic mutations is the major source of evolutionary 
novelty. More important is symbiogenesis, the evolution of new species 
from the coming together of members of diﬀ erent species. Symbiogenesis 
is the behavioral, physiological, and genetic fusion of diﬀ erent kinds 
of being; it leads to the evolution of chimeric new ones. One example is 
of originally pathogenic bacteria that invaded and killed many amoebae 
in the University of Tennessee laboratory of Kwang Jeon in the 1970s. 
He selected survivors, and eventually diﬀ erent amoebae with new species 
characteristics appeared among them. Th ese had retained 40,000 
bacteria in each amoeba! 
A new type of fruit ﬂ y evolved after it acquired an insect-loving bacterium 
that prevented it from successfully mating with its old partners. Indeed, 
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Francis Collins
Not entirely.
Th e evidence in support of Darwin’s theory 
of evolution is overwhelming. In my own ﬁ eld of 
genomics, the digital record of the long history 
of life on this planet — a complex and awesome story 
of gradual change in DNA acted upon by natural 
selection — provides incontrovertible proof of descent 
from a common ancestor. As the noted geneticist 
and evolutionary theorist Th eodosius Dobzhansky 
wrote several decades ago, “Nothing in biology 
makes sense except in the light of evolution.” And 
that includes humankind. 
But Dobzhansky believed in God. And so do I.
Regrettably, much of the current culture in the 
United States sees evolution as an aﬀ ront to belief in 
God. But the 40 percent of working scientists 
who are believers have a diﬀ erent view. Most of us 
are theistic evolutionists. We see evolution as 
God’s method for creation — and what an elegant 
method it is! Put another way, we see life (bios) as the consequence 
of God’s Word (the Logos). Th us, I like to refer to theistic evolution 
as “biologos.”
Scientists who share my view do not see evolution as incompatible with 
the Bible, and we are puzzled and distressed that so many modern-day 
Christians insist on an ultra-literal reading of Genesis, when thoughtful 
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believers down through the centuries have concluded that this story of 
God’s plan for creation was never intended to be read as a scientiﬁ c 
textbook. We see science as the way to understand the awesome nature 
of God’s creation and as a powerful method for answering the “how” 
questions about our universe. But we also see that science is powerless to 
answer the fundamental “why” questions, such as “Why is there something 
instead of nothing?,” “Why am I here?,” and “Why should good and 
evil matter?”
Let’s focus on this last question. One of the most notable characteristics 
of humanity, across centuries, cultures, and geographic locations, is a 
universal grasp of the concept of right and wrong and an inner voice that 
calls us to do the right thing. Th is is often referred to as the moral 
law. We may not always agree on what behaviors are right (which is heav-
ily inﬂ uenced by culture), but we generally agree that we should try 
to do good and avoid evil. When we break the moral law (which we do 
frequently, if we are honest with ourselves), we make excuses, only 
further demonstrating that we feel bound by the moral law in our 
dealings with others. 
Evolutionary arguments, which ultimately depend on reproductive 
ﬁ tness as the overarching goal, may explain some parts of this human urge 
toward altruism, especially if self-sacriﬁ cing acts are done on behalf 
of relatives or those from whom you might expect some future reciprocal 
beneﬁ t. But evolutionary models universally predict the need for reﬂ exive 
hostility to outside groups, and we humans do not seem to have gotten 
that memo. We especially admire cases in which individuals make 
sacriﬁ ces for strangers or members of outside groups: think of Mother 
Teresa, or Oskar Schindler, or the Good Samaritan. 
We should be skeptical of those who dismiss these acts of radical altruism 
as some sort of evolutionary misﬁ ring. And if these noble acts are frankly 
a scandal to reproductive ﬁ tness, might they instead point in a diﬀ erent 
direction — toward a holy, loving, and caring God, who instilled the moral 
law in each of us as a sign of our special nature and as a call to relationship 
with the Almighty? 
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Do not get me wrong. I am not arguing that the existence of the moral 
law somehow proves God’s existence. Such proofs cannot be provided 
by the study of nature. And there is an inherent danger in arguing that 
the moral law points to some sort of supernatural intervention in the 
early days of human history; this has the ﬂ avor of a “God of the gaps” 
argument. After all, much still remains to be understood about evolution’s 
inﬂ uence on human nature. But even if radically altruistic human acts 
can ultimately be explained on the basis of evolutionary mechanisms, this 
would do nothing to exclude God’s hand. For if God chose the process 
of evolution in the beginning to create humans in imago Dei, it would also 
be perfectly reasonable for God to have used this same process to instill 
knowledge of the moral law.
A deeper question raised by this debate is the fundamental nature 
of good and evil. Does morality actually have any foundation? To be 
consistent, a committed atheist, who argues that evolution can fully 
account for all aspects of human nature, must also argue that the human 
urge toward altruism, including its most radical and self-sacriﬁ cial 
forms, is a purely evolutionary artifact. Th is forces the conclusion that the 
concepts of good and evil have no real foundation, and that we have been 
hoodwinked by evolution into thinking that morality provides meaning-
ful standards of judgment. Yet few atheists seem willing to own up 
to this disturbing and depressing consequence of their worldview. 
On the contrary, the most aggressive of them seem quite comfortable 
pointing to the evil they see religion as having inspired. Isn’t that 
rather inconsistent?
I was once an atheist myself, and so I understand the temptation to 
fall into a completely materialistic view of human nature. But seeing 
all of humanity’s nobler attributes through the constricted lens of 
atheism and materialism ultimately leads to philosophical impoverish-
ment and even to the necessity of giving up concepts of benevolence 
and justice. I found that a whole world of interesting questions opened 
up for me once I accepted the possibility of a spiritual aspect to humanity. 
Geoﬀ rey Miller 
More fully by the day. 
In the last two decades, evolutionary psychology 
has cast new light on ever more facets of human 
nature. And contrary to popular critiques of the ﬁ eld, 
it has done so in ways that are ever more intellectually 
thrilling, morally enlightening, spiritually satisfying, 
and socially progressive. What we mean by “evolution” 
and “human nature” continues to develop through 
mutual interaction, like the passions of a whispering 
couple in a close-embrace tango. 
During the 1990s, biologists developed a whole 
new toolbox of ideas about the nature of evolution, 
including theories based on life history, multi-level 
selection, strong reciprocity, good-genes sexual 
selection, and costly signalling. Th ese terms may be 
unfamiliar to non-specialists, but they represent 
a revolution in Darwinian theory and have proven 
their value again and again in understanding aspects of human nature 
that defy simplistic “survival of the ﬁ ttest” reasoning.
Likewise, our understanding of human nature has been growing 
exponentially through work in evolutionary psychology, evolutionary 
anthropology, human evolutionary genetics, and primate behavior. Our 
model is no longer a tattered old treasure map of a few basic instincts 
(hunger, fear, lust) but a topographically detailed Google Earth panorama 
across a whole continent of familiar capacities (romantic love, moral 
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Still, evolutionary psychologists must guard against complacency. 
We should not imagine that we have discovered every important facet of 
human nature, or that evolutionary theory as it exists circa 2009 has 
told us everything we need to know about the selection pressures that 
have shaped human nature. 
Consider just one new development in biology: the whole new world of 
RNA, which may help explain the unique behavioral ﬂ exibility of 
the human brain. Th e “central dogma” of genetics since the 1950s was 
that DNA is transcribed into RNA, which is translated into proteins, 
which generate all the adaptive complexity of organic life. Th us, only 
the DNA sequences that code for proteins are important, and only 
evolutionary changes in protein-coding DNA are worth analyzing. When 
journalists report that humans have “only” some 25,000 genes — just a 
few more than the 20,000 of the C. elegans worm — they are referring to 
these protein-coding genes. 
Th is “central dogma” has guided the Human Genome Project, the 
HapMap project, and even the genome-wide association studies that 
dominate the human genetics journals these days. But the idea 
has been decisively overturned in the last decade by new discoveries 
about the diversity of RNA that is transcribed from DNA but that 
is not, in turn, translated into proteins. Most of this “non-coding” RNA 
seems to constitute a genomic regulatory system of vast complexity 
— a system that determines the expression of diﬀ erent protein-coding 
genes in diﬀ erent cell types, tissues, and organs at diﬀ erent times during 
development and in response to diﬀ erent environmental changes. Th e 
human genome has a vastly more complex RNA system than C. elegans. 
Th e molecular biologist John Mattick and others have argued that the 
evolution of this RNA system was crucial for three great innovations in 
life on earth: the emergence of the eukaryotic cell, the Cambrian 
explosion of multi-cellular life, and the complexity of the human brain. 
In this view, humans diﬀ er from other great apes not so much at the 
level of protein evolution but at the level of the RNA regulatory system 
that orchestrates the spatio-temporal patterning of gene expression and 
protein function. Th e inherited DNA that is translated into this RNA 
commitment, self-deprecating humor, conspicuous charity, and many 
more). New theories have led researchers to acknowledge new aspects of 
human nature, and recognizing previously overlooked aspects of human 
nature has promoted new progress in evolutionary theory. 
My own research has been inspired mostly by good-genes sexual selection 
theory (the idea that animals choose their partners based on cues about 
genetic quality) and costly-signalling theory (the idea that only animals in 
good condition can aﬀ ord seemingly pointless displays like extravagant 
plumage). Th ese theories have proved enormously useful in understanding 
a range of human behaviors that have seemed to have no clear survival 
payoﬀ s, like music, dance, art, humor, verbal creativity, conspicuous 
consumption, and altruism.
Consider a few examples of new empirical discoveries from research I 
have done with various collaborators:
* Gil Greengross and I showed that women are more attracted to men 
who use self-deprecating rather than other-deprecating humor during 
courtship (but only if the men are fairly high in social status). Th is is 
consistent with the costly-signalling idea that self-mockery is a virtue 
that only the successful can aﬀ ord.
* Martie Haselton and I showed that women at peak fertility, just before 
ovulation, show a stronger preference for creativity as opposed to wealth 
in potential mates. Th is supports the idea that creativity is an indicator of 
“good genes” rather than of potential as a “good provider.” 
* Vladas Griskevicius, several colleagues, and I showed that if men are 
put in a romantic mood rather than a neutral mood, they are more likely 
to spend money on conspicuous luxuries, whereas women spend more 
time on conspicuous charity, such that each sex is signalling a trait (social 
status or kindness) that is relatively more desired by the other sex. 
Each new ﬁ nding like this illustrates how new evolutionary theories can 
lead to discoveries that were never predicted by the standard “blank slate” 
view of human behavior.
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regulatory system does not just determine “innate instincts” or “hard-
wired” behaviors; it also orchestrates dynamic changes in brain function 
and behavior under diﬀ erent circumstances. 
Indeed, it seems likely that RNA is crucial in all sorts of behavioral 
ﬂ exibility that humans have, from feeling diﬀ erent moods (elation, love, 
depression, ambition) to laying down new memories, to super-charging 
our creativity, humor, and altruism when we are courting a new mate. 
All of this may be mediated by complex changes in gene expression through-
out the brain, over time scales ranging from hours to decades. We 
are realizing that our genes do not just determine the blueprint for an 
infant’s brain; they are working actively throughout our lives, governed 
by this vast RNA regulatory system, giving us degrees of behavioral 
creativity and ﬂ exibility that it will take us decades to understand. 
In short, evolution explains human nature very well indeed, but we are far 
from ﬁ nished in the grand project of naturalizing human consciousness.
Joan Roughgarden 
Not yet…
and almost surely never. Although human nature, 
like biological nature generally, results from a 
continuing process of evolution, the question before 
us is whether present-day evolutionary science 
explains human nature. Does it explain our religious 
beliefs and moral commitments as convincingly 
as it explains our more prosaic traits like, say, why we 
have four arms and legs instead of six? Obviously 
not. Evolutionary science has much more work to do 
before it can explain our more abstract traits. But 
how much more?
Religious beliefs, moral commitments, consciousness, 
and the free will to do right and wrong emerge 
in a social context. Th ese traits are not properties of 
an individual like the ability to hear high notes 
or to taste bitter ﬂ avors. Social behavior develops as 
individuals acquire experience with one another. It is a system of traits 
that forms when individuals interact. A white-crowned sparrow learns 
its song by listening to others as it grows up. Unlike its vocal chords, a 
bird’s song is a collective property belonging to its group.
What makes social behavior hard to understand is that interaction takes 
place during development rather than after it. By contrast, consider some 
socially important physical traits, like green or gray skin color in frogs. 
Th ese traits are formed not during social interaction but prior to it. In wet 
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With this approach, we have been able to show, for instance, that sexual 
conﬂ ict is not inevitable in the relationship between males and females 
in nature, as some evolutionary biologists claim, and we have demon-
strated that some forms of sexual intimacy may be interpreted as mecha-
nisms to enable friendship and teamwork among animals. All in all, 
our research suggests that the “selﬁ sh-gene” metaphor for evolution is 
misleading and inaccurate.
Still, the question remains whether evolutionary science, even after 
these and other improvements take root, will ever explain features of 
human behavior such as spirituality, morality, consciousness, free 
will, and so forth. But why stop there? Will evolutionary science ever 
explain most of the features of any species?
Th is question forces us to confront our own modest place in nature. Th e 
natural world is inﬁ nite, and even if the aggregate number of people who 
have ever lived were scientists working 24/7 on evolutionary research, 
their aggregate eﬀ ort would be ﬁ nite, leaving a still inﬁ nite set of evolu-
tionary mysteries. Do we know why the chameleon evolved to catch bugs 
with its tongue instead of sneaking up and pouncing on them? No. Will 
we ever? Probably not. Do we know why and how humans have come 
to possess a sense of morality? Not yet. Will we ever? Almost surely not.
Scientiﬁ c research requires the expenditure of scarce time and money, 
and for most people, the value of discovering the origins of our moral sense 
is dwarfed by the health beneﬁ ts of curing cancer or the environmental 
beneﬁ ts of conserving tropical forests. Questions about the evolution of 
morality seem destined to linger indeﬁ nitely on some back burner.
Th ere is nothing inappropriate about asking how we evolved our sense 
of morality or any other aspect of human nature. Indeed, I believe that 
investigating how evolution occurs is a sacred calling and that our 
appreciation for every aspect of human life is enriched by an evolutionary 
perspective. But some parts of this enterprise are more practical than 
others — and also are far more likely to succeed. 
years, with green moss on the trees, green frogs are more camouﬂ aged 
and are able to ﬁ ght longer for space than gray frogs before seeking 
cover from predators, whereas in dry years, gray frogs are able to defend 
their territory longer. Th e competitive balance point between green 
and gray frogs changes from year to year, depending on the year’s rainfall, 
favoring green frogs in wet years and gray frogs in dry years. At each 
year’s balance point, the frogs occupy all of the living space according 
to a color ratio such that a newly arriving frog of either color has no 
advantage over another frog. Th us, the colors inﬂ uence the outcome of 
territorial interactions, but the colors themselves are not generated by 
those interactions.
Th e competitive balance between socially important traits was studied 
by the late John Maynard Smith, a theoretical biologist who introduced 
mathematical game theory into evolutionary biology. Maynard Smith 
applied his analysis to the evolution of social behavior among competing 
individuals, assuming that their behavioral inclinations or “strategies” 
were already formed prior to their interaction. He famously discussed the 
evolutionary outcome of competition between “altruists” who interact 
with “selﬁ sh” individuals, as though the traits of altruism and selﬁ shness 
were permanent characteristics of the actors, just as green or gray body 
coloration might be for a frog. 
But in most social behavior, how an organism acts, whether it behaves 
altruistically or selﬁ shly, depends in large part on its experience 
with others while maturing. Moreover, the Maynard Smith approach 
stipulates that behavioral interactions are inherently competitive 
because he considered their outcome to be a competitive balance point.
To go beyond the limitations of Maynard Smith’s model, my students 
and I have introduced the idea of “social selection.” Our approach 
decomposes the evolutionary theory of social behavior into two levels or 
“tiers.” Th e “lower” tier analyzes the development of behavioral actions 
using game-theory techniques but without Maynard Smith’s assumption 
of inherently competitive behavior; we employ criteria for both coopera-
tive and competitive endpoints. Th e “higher” tier analyzes the evolution 
of behavioral tendencies using population-genetic techniques. 
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Martin Nowak 
In part.
I am deeply fascinated by evolution, and I wish to 
expand the boundaries of the evolutionary explanation 
as far as possible. Yet I do not think that all aspects 
of human nature can be explained by evolution. Th e 
question is subtle, and the answer depends on how 
we choose to deﬁ ne “human nature.”
I like to think of human nature as a collection of 
thoughts, feelings, and actions that humans experi-
ence or perform. Language, for example, is a funda-
mental aspect of human nature. A child growing up 
in an environment of speakers develops a language 
faculty. Th e thoughts and ideas that are expressed 
in the languages of the world are all part of human 
nature. Similarly, we like to listen to music and 
perform it. A few of us compose music. Music is part 
of human nature. Th ere is also something very 
intuitive about numbers and geometric objects, and 
the ability to do some basic math seems to be part of 
human nature. 
Yet the great theorems of mathematics are statements of an eternal truth 
that comes from another world, a world that seems to be entirely inde-
pendent of the particular trajectory that biological evolution has taken 
on earth. Th e great symphonies of Beethoven and Mahler capture 
glimpses of a beauty that is absolute and everlasting. Beyond the tempo-
ral, materialistic world there is an unchanging reality.
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My position is very simple. Evolution has led to a human brain that can 
gain access to a Platonic world of forms and ideas. Th is world is eternal 
and not the product of evolution, but it does aﬀ ect human nature deeply. 
Th erefore evolution cannot possibly explain all aspects of human nature. 
What is evolution? Evolution occurs whenever there is a population of 
reproducing individuals. Reproduction at diﬀ erent rates leads to natural 
selection. Mistakes during reproduction lead to mutation. Mutation and 
natural selection are two fundamental “forces” of evolution. 
Reproduction can be genetic or cultural. Th e former gives rise to genetic 
evolution, which has molded life on earth over the last four billion years. 
Th e latter is the most decisive factor shaping human society. Humans 
with language invented a mechanism for nearly unlimited cultural 
evolution. New ideas and behaviors can spread rapidly by learning, teach-
ing, and imitation. Cultural evolution allows rapid innovation and is 
responsible for the dramatic changes that have occurred on this planet in 
the last few millennia. 
Sadly, humans do not use their evolved traits only for good ends. Th ey 
wage wars of destruction. Th ey ﬁ ght each other, and they destroy the 
environment that is essential for their survival. Despite all of this, a ﬂ ame 
of love is burning inside us that cannot be extinguished. 
I am fascinated by questions concerning the evolution of cooperation 
and altruistic behavior. Natural selection is based on competition between 
individuals. It introduces conﬂ ict. Cooperation means that one individu-
al pays a cost for another individual to receive a beneﬁ t. Cooperation is 
opposed by natural selection unless speciﬁ c mechanisms are in place. 
For humans, the fundamental mechanisms encouraging cooperation are 
direct and indirect reciprocity. Direct reciprocity is based on repeated 
interactions between the same two individuals: my behavior toward you 
depends on what you have done to me. Indirect reciprocity is based on 
repeated interactions in a group: my behavior toward you also depends 
on what you have done to others. Cooperation among humans is related 
to altruistic behavior. Loving others and trying to help them are impor-
tant aspects of human nature. 
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Cooperation is, in my opinion, another fundamental “force” of evolution. 
Cooperation is needed for construction. Whenever evolution moves to 
higher levels of organization, cooperation is involved. Th e emergence of 
multi-cellular organisms, for example, requires cooperation among cells. 
And human language would not have evolved without sustained coop-
eration among potential speakers and hearers. 
Th ere is a fascinating additional problem concerning our present 
understanding of evolution. Evolution is a search process. Populations 
of reproducing individuals “search” for short-term solutions, such as 
adaptations to a new environment or modiﬁ cations of a social system. 
But the search process has to operate within a given space of possibilities. 
Th is “search space” ultimately determines what can evolve. For example, 
evolution can ﬁ nd intelligent life, if it is part of the search space, but it 
cannot construct the possibility of intelligent life. For science to 
fully “explain” intelligent life (or other fundamental properties of living 
systems), we need not only a theory of evolutionary dynamics but 
also a theory describing how the fundamental laws of nature span the 
search space. 
As a scientist, I could adopt the narrow position that I am exclusively 
interested in those aspects of human nature that can be analyzed by 
scientiﬁ c methods. Th is is a valuable and useful perspective, and it will 
continue to generate much scientiﬁ c progress. But in my Faustian 
search for truth, I realize that science does not give a complete analysis of 
human existence. We are all confronted by questions concerning 
the mystery and purpose of life, which cannot be answered by natural 
science alone. 
I subscribe to the ideas of what Leibniz called “perennial philosophy”: 
there is an unchanging reality beneath the world of change; this reality is 
also at the core of every human existence; and the purpose of life 
is to discover this reality. In the context of my own Christian faith, the 
fundamental aspect of human nature is our relationship with God 
and our participation in God’s love and eternity. Th is particular aspect of 
human nature is also not a product of evolution. 
Photo credit: Erik Jacobs.
Robert Wright 
Yes. 
Two centuries after the birth of Darwin, the Dar-
winian explanation of human nature is essentially 
complete. We now know why people everywhere 
— notwithstanding diﬀ erences of culture and 
context — experience the same basic emotions, 
the same kinds of hopes and fears, even the same 
distortions of perception and cognition.
Ever since Darwin published On the Origin of Species 
in 1859, it has been clear that natural selection could 
explain the more obviously animal parts of human 
nature. Th ings like hunger and lust are no-brainers: 
genes that encourage you to ingest nutrients and 
have sex do better in the Darwinian marketplace 
than genes that counsel starvation and abstinence. 
Nor is it any great mystery how humans came to be 
socially competitive. High social status brings improved access to mates, 
so genes that fuel the pursuit of status fare well. 
Much subtler legacies of evolution have come to light in recent decades 
as the modern science of evolutionary psychology has emerged. Not just 
animal appetites and drives, but ﬁ ne-grained tendencies of emotion and 
cognition can now be ascribed with some conﬁ dence to natural selection. 
For example, genes inclining us to lower the social status of rivals by 
spreading unﬂ attering gossip or harsh moral appraisals would be favored 
by natural selection. And, of course, the most eﬀ ective propagandist is 
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someone who believes the propaganda, so our everyday moral evalua-
tions of people may be skewed by our genes.
Maybe the biggest accomplishment of post-Darwin Darwinians has 
come in explaining the mushy side of human nature: compassion, 
empathy, and so on. Th ese emotions make obvious Darwinian sense 
only when they are directed toward those endearing little vehicles of 
genetic transmission known as oﬀ spring. But what about when they 
are directed toward collateral kin — siblings, cousins — or even non-kin? 
Over the past half-century, two theories — the theory of kin selection 
and the theory of reciprocal altruism, respectively — have answered 
these questions. 
Th e theory of reciprocal altruism has also illuminated several other big 
parcels of the emotional landscape — gratitude, obligation, forgiveness, 
and righteous indignation. Even the sense of justice — the intuition 
that it is “right” for good deeds to be rewarded and for bad deeds to be 
punished — now makes sense as a product of natural selection. 
Th e evolutionary roots of human nature have not been “proved” in the 
sense that theorems are proved, and they are not as ﬁ rmly corroborated 
as, say, the ﬁ rst law of thermodynamics. But they grow increasingly 
plausible as more psychological experiments are done from a Darwinian 
angle, more evolutionary dynamics are modeled by computer, and the 
biochemical links between genes and behavior become clearer. One 
chemical alone — oxytocin — has been implicated in maternal bonding, 
romantic bonding, and the trust that undergirds friendship.
None of this is to say that no puzzles remain or that there are no 
disagreements among Darwinians. Spats between “group selectionists” 
and “individual selectionists,” though often overstated and in some 
cases merely semantic, do sometimes have real consequences. Still, this 
inﬁ ghting results from a surplus of serviceable Darwinian theories, 
not a shortage. Th ere can no longer be reasonable doubt that the emo-
tions and inclinations that people everywhere share are the legacy 
of natural selection. Darwin’s theory has illuminated and explained the 
fundamental unity of human experience.
Many people ﬁ nd it depressing that some of our noblest impulses are 
reducible to genetic self-interest — and, worse, that this self-interest 
can subtly corrupt our moral evaluations and our conduct. As it happens, 
the fact that they ﬁ nd this depressing is itself explicable in Darwinian 
terms. Natural selection has inclined us to present ourselves as public-
spirited and even selﬂ ess, and in the service of that goal we are inclined 
to convince ourselves that we really are 
public-spirited and even selﬂ ess. In other 
words, we naturally consider ourselves 
noble, not just “noble.”
But this points to the sense in which the 
Darwinian explanation of human nature is not 
depressing. If we are naturally inclined to 
overestimate our goodness, then a theory that 
exposes us to a truer view of ourselves has the 
potential to inspire self-improvement. What 
should depress us is how much time we spend 
deluding ourselves about our goodness, not the 
fact that we now have a chance to escape 
delusion and make amends.
Another dubious source of Darwinian depres-
sion is the idea that an evolutionary explanation 
of human nature leaves us with no great awe-inspiring mysteries about 
the human condition. Actually, Darwinism, while solving the mystery of 
human nature per se, has revealed deeper mysteries that it has no hope 
of solving. 
For example: how on earth did the universe wind up generating an 
algorithm (natural selection) that turns an imperative of utter selﬁ shness 
at the genetic level into altruism at the individual level? An algorithm 
this elegant is at least as awe-inspiring as more direct means of creating 
humanity and other species. Charles Kingsley, an Anglican clergyman 
and a naturalist, wrote in a letter to Darwin, “I have gradually learnt to 
see that it is just as noble a conception of Deity, to believe that He 
created primal forms capable of self-development into all forms needful 
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pro tempore and pro loco, as to believe that He required a fresh act of 
intervention to supply the lacunas which he himself had made. I question 
whether the former be not the loftier thought.”
Finally, there is the mystery of consciousness. I have said that natural 
selection readily explains emotions like compassion and indignation. 
Strictly speaking, it does not. It explains the behaviors with which 
compassion and indignation are correlated and the neural programs that 
govern those behaviors. Why these behaviors and this neural governance 
should have emotional correlates — why there is subjective experience at 
all — is actually a mystery. Only a few Darwinian thinkers, such as 
Steven Pinker and the late John Maynard Smith, have appreciated this 
problem. Daniel Dennett and others deny the mystery, but in doing so, 
they sometimes veer perilously close to denying the existence of con-
sciousness itself. 
Subjective experience, of course, is what gives life meaning. A planet 
full of robots that have no interior life but behave and speak as we do is 
not a planet worth caring about. If none of these robots can feel pain, 
what is wrong with smashing them? If none can feel joy — or anything 
else — what is good about “life” on this planet?
What Darwinism tells us is how natural selection gave human life its 
distinctively rich texture of meaning. Darwinism can also give us 
guidance as we try to better ourselves and make that meaning richer still. 
What Darwinism does not tell us is why there is meaning at all. 
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Only up to a point.
Evolution explains human origins. We know that 
humans share recent ancestors with the apes. Our 
lineage separates from that of the chimpanzees, 
our closest living relatives, six or seven million years 
ago. Scientists call members of this lineage “homi-
nins.” Th e ﬁ rst fossil of a hominin was discovered 
on the island of Java in 1894, twelve years after the 
death of Charles Darwin, who had predicted 
that such remains would eventually be found. Th at 
hominin belonged to the species Homo erectus 
and lived more than a million years ago.
Over the past century, thousands of other hominin 
fossils have been discovered. Th e oldest of these 
belong to species quite diﬀ erent from modern humans, 
classiﬁ ed with exotic names that usually refer to 
where they were unearthed. Sahelanthropus tchadensis, 
found in Chad in Central Africa, lived between six 
and seven million years ago. Australopithecus afarensis, 
found in the Afar region of East Africa, lived 
between three and four million years ago. And Homo heidelbergensis, ﬁ rst 
found in Germany, lived between 500,000 and one million years ago. 
For several million years, hominins had a small brain, similar to that of a 
chimpanzee and weighing about one pound. Brain size started to 
increase about two million years ago, with the species Homo habilis, the 
ﬁ rst of the hominins to make stone tools. It seems likely that smarter 
individuals with somewhat larger brains would have been able to make 
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better tools, which was advantageous for hunting, ﬁ ghting, and so on. 
As a result, smarter individuals would have left behind more descendants. 
Gradually, over the last two million years, brain size tripled, reaching 
about three pounds in the average modern human.
Evolution also allows us to trace the origin and migration of human 
populations. Modern humans evolved in tropical and subtropical 
Africa about 150,000 years ago. Th ey colonized much of Africa and parts 
of Asia and Europe starting about 100,000 years ago, and America 
about 15,000 years ago. As one would expect from so recent a diaspora 
(recent, that is, on the evolutionary scale), humans from diﬀ erent parts of 
the world are genetically quite similar, despite their conspicuous diﬀ er-
ences in skin color, body conﬁ guration, hair, and other traits that help us 
to distinguish people from diﬀ erent parts of the world.
Over the past decade, evolutionary geneticists have started to decipher 
the genomes of humans and chimps. Surprisingly, in the genome regions 
shared by the two species, nearly 99 percent of the DNA is identical. 
But we also have discovered distinctive human features. Genes active in 
the development of the brain, for instance, have changed more in the 
human lineage than in the chimp lineage, and so has the gene called FOXP2, 
which relates to speech. In fact, researchers have identiﬁ ed 585 genes 
that have evolved faster in humans than in chimps. But there is still much 
that we do not know about what makes us so diﬀ erent from apes. 
Fortunately, we have been searching in earnest only for a decade, and 
discoveries will continue to accumulate. 
Evolutionary neurobiology has made similar advances. We now know a 
great deal about which parts of the brain have become more diﬀ erentiated 
in humans than in apes, and what functions they play in memory, speech, 
hand articulation, and so on. Much has been learned as well about how 
light, sound, temperature, resistance, and other impressions are transmitted 
to the brain by our sense organs. Still, despite all this progress, the ﬁ eld 
remains in its infancy. Th ose questions that matter the most to us remain 
shrouded in mystery: how physical phenomena (the chemical and 
electric signals by which neurons communicate) become feelings, sensa-
tions, concepts, and all the other elements of consciousness, and how the 
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mind, a reality whose properties include free will and self-awareness, 
emerges from the diversity of these experiences.
Humans also have opened up a new mode of 
evolution: adaptation by technological 
manipulation and culture. We have developed 
the capacity to modify hostile environments 
according to the needs of our genes. Th e 
discovery of ﬁ re and the fabrication of clothing 
and shelter have allowed us to spread from 
the warm tropical and subtropical regions of 
the Old World, to which we are biologically 
adapted, to most of the Earth. Humans 
did not wait until genes evolved that would 
provide anatomical protection against cold 
temperatures by means of fur or hair. 
Nor have we bided our time in expectation 
of wings or gills: we have conquered the air and seas with artfully 
designed contrivances. It is the human brain (or rather, the human mind) 
that has made humankind the most successful — by most meaningful 
standards — of living species.
But culture includes much more than adaptation to the environment 
and much more than science and technology. Culture includes art 
and literature; history and political organizations; economic and legal 
systems; philosophy, ethics, and religion. Th ese all-important compo-
nents of human nature transcend evolutionary biology and every 
other science. Science has nothing decisive to say about values, whether 
economic, aesthetic, or moral; nothing to say about the meaning of 
life and its purpose; and nothing to say about religious beliefs — except, 
of course, in those cases when these values and activities transcend 
their proper scope and make demonstrably false assertions about the 
natural world.
Science is a way of knowing, but it is not the only way. Evolution tells 
us much, but certainly not everything, about human experience and the 
human predicament. In Th e Myth of Sisyphus, Albert Camus asserted 
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that we learn more about ourselves and the world from a relaxed evening 
gazing at the starry heavens and taking in the scent of grass than from 
science’s reductive ways. Th is may be literary exaggeration, but there can 
be no doubt that we learn about human nature by reading Shakespeare’s 
King Lear, contemplating the self-portraits of Rembrandt, and listening 
to Tchaikovsky’s Symphonie Pathétique. We humans judge our actions 
toward others according to systems of morality, and we derive meaning 
and purpose from religious beliefs. Evolution may explain our capacity to 
hold these principles and beliefs, but it does not explain the principles 
and beliefs themselves.
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Eva Jablonka 
Yes, but… 
we have to qualify what we mean by “human nature,” 
by “explain,” and by “evolution.” 
If, like Aristotle, we see “human nature” as something 
that depends on a basic animal nature, which in 
turn depends on a nature that is common to all living 
things, then the answer to the question is long 
and complicated. It has to include the evolution 
of the goal-directed, teleological systems underlying 
the origin of life and the acquisition of a mentality 
that endows every animal with a will, as well 
as the evolution of the unique aspects of the human 
mind. An answer would amount to re-writing 
Aristotle’s De Anima using a 21st-century evolution-
ary framework.
But I think that the question being asked is a more 
modest one, highlighting the uniqueness of human 
nature as compared, for example, with the nature 
of our evolutionarily close relative, the chimpanzee. Many people are 
ready to accept that evolution explains chimpanzee nature, but not that it 
explains human nature. Th ey assume that at some deﬁ nite point in 
evolutionary history, God intervened and endowed the human lineage 
with something that has set humankind apart from all other animals. 
So let us consider these more limited questions: Is there a line of demar-
cation between humans and chimpanzees that makes humans very 
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diﬀ erent? And can we explain human nature as a product of an evolutionary 
process, without miracles? I believe that the answer to both questions is “yes.” 
Much has been written about how humans are unique or special, but I 
favor the philosopher Ernst Cassirer’s views on the matter. He maintained 
that what sets us apart is symbolic systems, most notably, our capacity 
to think and communicate using language. Th is, he argued, is the founda-
tion of our rationality and religiosity and for creating long-term goals 
and abstract concepts like justice and truth, which organize human psych-
ology and social life. Cassirer is right, I believe — but none of this 
changes the fact that our capacity to use symbols is a product of evolution. 
Describing the evolution of this capacity is an incredibly diﬃ  cult task, 
because it has complex and multiple social, cognitive, and emotional bases. 
But during the last ﬁ fteen years great progress has been made in under-
standing it, especially with regard to our linguistic capacity. Although we 
are only at the beginning of this great intellectual journey, the frame-
work for explaining the origins and evolution of symbolic systems is now 
in place.
At this point I also must qualify what I mean by “explain,” in particular, 
how an evolutionary account can be said to be explanatory. If we 
can describe the biological basis for the appearance of a new trait in a 
population, describe how and why it spreads, and how, over time, it 
becomes increasingly more sophisticated, we may claim to have pro-
vided an evolutionary explanation of this trait. Evolutionary biologists 
recognize that at present there are only partial evolutionary descriptions 
of most complex behavioral traits. Evolution explains cooperation 
among ants, for instance, but we are still far from being able to give a full 
causal account of how cooperation is instantiated in the biology of ants 
and of how every aspect of such cooperation has evolved. Th e situation 
is similar but even more diﬃ  cult with respect to the human ability to 
use language and other symbols. But the question is tractable and answer-
able within an evolutionary framework.
Here I must qualify yet another term, “evolution.”  Th e evolutionary 
framework that we need to use in this case is much wider than the one to 
which we are accustomed. Th e great evolutionary biologist Th eodosius 
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Dobzhansky famously deﬁ ned evolution as “change in the genetic 
constitution of populations over time,” but this deﬁ nition is too narrow 
and, therefore, misleading. We have to think about more than genes. 
My colleague Marion Lamb and I have suggested that evolution should 
be redeﬁ ned as the “set of processes that lead to changes in the nature 
and frequency of heritable types in populations over time.” Heritable types 
include: genotypes, types of transmissible epigenetic (that is, develop-
mentally acquired) variations, types of socially learned animal behavior, 
and types of symbol-based transmitted information. 
With humans, the transmission of information via symbols has resulted 
in a very rich cultural evolution. Th is transmission is of major importance 
not only for our cultural history but also for our genetic evolution. Under 
the appropriate ecological and social conditions, even a crude ability to 
communicate using symbols, similar to that seen in trained chimpanzees, 
can trigger greatly accelerated genetic evolution of the capacity to use 
symbolic systems. Th is, in turn, will lead to more elaborate symbol-based 
cultural evolution, which will favor further genetic changes, and so on. 
Recognizing this positive feedback loop between genetic and cultural 
evolution may help us to understand how human language evolved and 
how other cognitive and emotional features speciﬁ c to humans — artistic 
ability, rationality, religiosity — emerged and became consolidated 
during our evolutionary history.
Th e original question therefore needs to be rephrased in a clumsier but 
less ambiguous way: Can an expanded evolutionary framework account 
for the speciﬁ cally human features that set us apart from chimpanzees 
and that most of us recognize as constituting human nature? Th e answer 
is “yes.” Indeed, I believe that we can answer this question aﬃ  rmatively 
even if we are committed to the more ambitious Aristotelian concept 
of human nature, which includes not only the nature of much simpler 
animals endowed with wills but the nature of life itself. Th ere is historical 
continuity among the diﬀ erent “natures” that culminate in human nature. 
Giving a fuller account of the continuous evolution of these goal-directed 
systems is one of the great scientiﬁ c challenges of this century. 
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Jeﬀ rey Schloss 
Totally, for a Martian.
Humans bear the stamp of a fascinating evolutionary 
past, and theories elucidating our biological origins 
immensely enrich our understanding of what it 
is to be human. But, no, evolution does not “explain 
human nature.” In fact, the power of evolutionary 
theory to illuminate our humanity derives importantly 
both from what it is able to penetrate and from 
what remains opaque to it.
So what does evolutionary theory explain well? 
For starters, it provides one-stop shopping for many 
of the universal or nearly universal features of 
our species. It presents compelling accounts of our 
intense need to give and receive parental and social 
care; of our wide-ranging emotions and the ability 
to recognize them facially; of our shared cognitive 
biases, phobias, and desires; and of our capacities to 
form lifelong social attachments and aversions, 
to fall in love, and to envision not just the future but 
also other minds, including supernatural minds.
Evolutionary analysis also helps us to understand why human groups are 
structured around kinship and reciprocity, why they are monogamous or 
polygamous but rarely polyandrous, why they are averse to incest, reliant 
on the division of labor, and universally inclined to punish violations 
of fairness, to accumulate and transmit extra-genetic information, and to 
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cooperate on a scale far beyond that of any other species on the planet. 
For all of these varied but crucial features of humanity, evolution 
provides a single, empirically assessable account in terms of a principle 
— natural selection — that also explains the features of other living 
organisms. Evolution locates human nature securely within the conﬁ nes 
of nature itself.
Th ough many of the attributes that I have listed above are universal 
among humans, not all of them are. Evolutionary theory helps us to 
understand this too, by reformulating biological notions of  “human 
nature” in terms of central tendencies rather than inevitabilities. It 
navigates between naïve assertions of organically unconstrained cultural 
relativism, on the one hand, and ﬁ xed and universal biological nativism, 
on the other. Th e upshot of explaining the statistically normal while 
eschewing the normative is that evolution cannot provide counsel for 
what humans should be (work done by traditional concepts of human 
nature from Aristotle on) and only posits accounts of how humans 
came to be what we are.
It turns out, though, that even this more modest goal is not fully attained 
by evolutionary theory. In the ﬁ rst place, evolution is absolutely necessary 
but not suﬃ  cient for explaining just the most straightforward aspects of 
an organism. Bat wings, for example, only make sense as evolved deriva-
tions of mammalian forelimbs. But to understand them fully also requires 
concepts outside of evolution, like the principles of aerodynamics 
and gravity. Evolution is a search engine that combs possibility space, 
but to explain what it comes up with, we need to understand both 
the engine and the space. Like a Shakespearian play, the evolutionary 
drama is determined not only by the playwright (in this case, natural 
selection, a very dumb author) but also by the constraints of an Elizabe-
than theater company. To understand the human and our place in 
nature, we must understand the budget and the bounties of the world 
that made humans possible. 
In addition, when it comes to the most distinctive aspects of human-
ity — language, morality, religious belief, altruism, even our capacity for 
science itself — we do not yet have complete or even agreed-upon 
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evolutionary explanations. Th is does not signal a need to give up on 
evolutionary accounts. Indeed, there has been a recent ﬂ owering of 
promising proposals for each of these qualities. Among the alternative 
evolutionary explanations are theories based on sexual selection, 
cooperative adaptation, dominance displays, group-level function, and 
traits as byproducts. All of these contending accounts are consistent 
with the process of genetic selection that operates in other species. 
But how do we engage the thorny issue of why 
our species so often makes choices that do not 
maximize or even contribute to our reproduc-
tive ﬁ tness? One possibility is the idea of 
“memes” (that is, transmitted units of cultural 
information), which may involve a distinctly 
human and non-genetic form of evolution. 
Since being proposed by Richard Dawkins to 
explain behaviors that “we alone on earth” 
exhibit, the idea has been criticized by some as 
too vague, too dualistic, too culturally reduc-
tionistic, or too assertive of human uniqueness. 
Whatever the precise character of the 
mechanism, however, one thing seems clear: 
genetic selection has sprouted an organism 
whose behavior is not fully reducible to 
genetic selection. 
Th e very existence of these fascinating 
debates constitutes an instructive example of 
how evolution illuminates the distinctively human by what it is both able 
and not yet able to explain. Th is does not mean that we will not close the 
gap. But science does not give credit for future understanding. At present, 
evolution does not explain these important aspects of humanity.
Even if we achieve a fully adequate evolutionary account of things like 
morality, religious belief, love, and sentience (perhaps the most diﬃ  cult 
question of all), it still would not tell us what these things are or what it is 
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to experience them as humans. Th is is not a deﬁ ciency of evolutionary 
theory. To the contrary, it is a limitation directly related to its potency as 
an empirical science. But not all questions that we humans ask about 
ourselves are scientiﬁ c ones. 
On my bookshelf, I have an extensive collection of classic (and often 
conﬂ icting) volumes on evolution and human nature. It is uncanny 
how many of them begin with the same aﬃ  rmation of the objective nature 
of their approach: their accounts, they suggest, are of just the sort 
that Martian biologists or intelligent visitors from another planet would 
develop. Several even claim that all of humanity’s own ideas about our 
nature prior to evolutionary theory are “worthless” and that we would be 
better oﬀ  to “ignore them completely.” Indeed, one of the most prominent 
accounts — Richard Dawkins again — asserts that, if extraterrestrial 
intellects were to visit earth, it is unlikely they would be interested in 
music or religion, and Shakespeare might “mean nothing,” but 
they would revere Darwin, whose ideas “really matter in the universe.”
Given biology’s rejection of disembodied Cartesian rationality and 
our understanding of how reason is deeply intertwined with emotions and 
values, the Darwin versus Shakespeare dichotomy is probably just plain 
wrong. Nor is much gained by invoking a sort of interplanetary argument 
from authority: “E.T. believes me — so should you!” But the real problem 
with so starkly objective an approach is what is left out. What can we 
learn about the nature of being human from an account that in principle 
could be developed by an alien intelligence without access to human 
interiority or any interest in humanity’s most enduring questions? 
Pretty much everything a Martian scientist might want to know. 
Does evolution explain human nature? No. Does it enrich our under-
standing of the human? Most profoundly. But so does Shakespeare.
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David Sloan Wilson 
Yes and no. 
When we say that a species has a “nature,” we 
are referring to its evolved properties. For a lactose-
digesting bacteria, digesting lactose is part of its 
“nature.” If we turn it into a new genetic strain unable 
to digest lactose, we will have changed its “nature.” 
Similarly, domesticated animals have diﬀ erent 
“natures” from their wild ancestors.
My simple formula equating “nature” with evolved 
properties might seem boring at ﬁ rst, until we 
realize that there is more to evolution than genetic 
evolution. Genes are only one mechanism of inheri-
tance. Some immunological, psychological, and 
cultural processes also count as evolutionary. Th ey 
too rely on the open-ended variation and selective 
retention of traits, but they are based on non-genetic 
inheritance mechanisms. 
People and cultures shaped by these fast-paced 
evolutionary processes no longer have the same “nature,” any more than 
two bacterial strains that have diverged by genetic evolution. In this 
fashion, my simple and seemingly boring formula can be understood to 
say that humanity as a whole does not have a single “nature.” Instead, 
each and every person and culture has its own “nature.” 
Th is is not just idle word play. We are only beginning to appreciate the 
fact that human cultural diversity is fundamentally like biological 
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diversity. Humanity is more like a multi-species ecosystem than a 
single biological species. A culture, like a species, has a historical 
phylogeny (that is, a sequence of events in its evolutionary trajectory) 
and is adapted to its local environment. Th e body of knowledge 
that members of Arctic cultures must learn and transmit to survive in 
their harsh environment is mind-boggling when understood in 
detail — and very diﬀ erent from the equally extensive body of knowledge 
that members of desert cultures must master. In what sense do 
they have the same “nature,” any more than a polar bear and a camel? 
Th is is equally true of modern cultural diversity. Only a few decades 
ago, American psychologists conﬁ dently assumed that their studies of 
college students revealed a universal human nature. Economists treated 
individual utility maximization as a grand explanatory principle. Moral 
philosophers assumed that their own intuition was representative of 
everyone’s intuition. Th e failure of these grand generalizations has been a 
humbling experience. As the social psychologist Richard Nisbett put it, 
“Psychologists who choose not to do cross-cultural psychology may 
have chosen to be ethnographers instead.” Or, in the immortal words of 
George Bernard Shaw, “Forgive him, for he is a savage and believes 
that the customs of his tribe are the laws of nature.”
But this is not the whole story. Only some immunological, psychological, 
and cultural processes qualify as evolutionary in their own right. Immu-
nologists distinguish between the “innate” and “adaptive” components of 
the immune system. Th e innate component consists of ﬁ xed responses to 
invading organisms, such as the ability of macrophages to recognize 
and engulf bacteria based on their surface properties, recruit other macro-
phages to wound sites, and so on. Th ese highly sophisticated responses 
developed through genetic evolution, but they are not open-ended 
evolutionary processes. Th ey are species-typical, in contrast to the unique 
suite of antibodies that evolves in every individual, thanks to the adaptive 
(that is, open-ended evolutionary) component of the immune system. 
In addition, the adaptive component of the immune system requires 
an elaborate architecture that is genetically innate and therefore part of 
the “nature” of our species. Species-typical mechanisms create the 
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diversity of antibodies, distribute them 
throughout the body, cause those that success-
fully bind to antigens to reproduce, keep them 
around for a long period of time as a “memory,” 
and so on. Th e neurobiologist and evolutionist 
William H. Calvin coined the term “Darwin 
machine” to describe any fast-paced process 
of evolution built by the slow-paced process of 
genetic evolution. Darwin machines must 
include a genetically evolved architecture (the 
“machine”) if open-ended evolutionary 
processes are to achieve biologically adaptive 
outcomes. 
What holds for the immune system also holds 
for psychological and cultural processes. 
For example, immediate threats to a person 
result in automatic psychological defense responses analogous to 
macrophages rushing to a wound site. Th ese responses are highly adaptive 
products of genetic evolution, but they are not open-ended evolutionary 
processes in their own right. Calling them part of our “nature” should 
be uncontroversial. In addition, our open-ended behavioral ﬂ exibility, as 
individuals and as cultures, requires a genetically evolved architecture 
no less than the immune system. A more poetic metaphor than a “Darwin 
machine” is a musical instrument. It can produce an inﬁ nite number of 
songs but also has a single “nature.” 
Why do we ask questions about human nature in the ﬁ rst place? Many 
people are interested primarily in human potential, our capacity as 
individuals and societies to change for the better. For some, saying that 
we have a nature is threatening because it seems to deny our capacity 
for change, raising the specter of genetic determinism. For others, saying 
that we have a nature is enticing because it promises the same kind of 
understanding for humanity that evolutionary theory currently oﬀ ers for 
the rest of life.
Answering “yes and no” to the question oﬀ ers the best of both worlds. We 
do not have a single nature as a species because we are actively evolving, 
thanks to the rapid processes of evolution that employ non-genetic 
inheritance mechanisms. Yet, a sophisticated knowledge of evolution is 
required to understand both our genetically evolved nature and our 
capacity for change. Indeed, just because we have a capacity for change 
does not mean that we will necessarily change for the better. Evolution 
frequently results in outcomes that are highly undesirable for long-term 
human welfare. If we want to change for the better as individuals and 
societies, we must learn how to manage fast-paced evolutionary processes 
to take us where we want to go. Might this be possible in the foreseeable 
future? Th e answer to that question is “yes.” 
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